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INTRODUCTION 
[U]nlike conventional contract analysis, application of 
promissory estoppel as expressed in section 90 requires that the 
issue of injustice be specifically addressed.1 
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Zohar Gan, Moshe Gelbard, Shahar Lifshitz, Peter Linzer, Tali Marcus, Roni M. 
Rosenberg, and Zvi H. Triger. I also thank the participants in the workshops in the 
College of Management School of Law and in the Netanya Academic College School 
of Law. I would also like to thank the staff of the St. John’s Law Review for their 
excellent editing work. This Article was presented at the 10th Annual International 
Conference on Contracts at William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, 
Las Vegas, in February 2015. 
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Promissory estoppel2 has evolved as a mechanism to enforce 
non-bargained for, relied upon promises.  It is considered a 
secondary rule of enforceable promises and as a narrow and 
limited substitute for consideration.3  Promissory estoppel is 
categorized as a contract, tort, or equitable doctrine and 
classified, accordingly, as promise-based, assent-based, reliance-
based, or equity-based liability.4 
The law requires that four elements be present in order to 
invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel:  First, there has to be 
a clear, definite, and unambiguous promise; second, the promisor 
must have had reason to expect reliance on the promise; third, 
the promise must have induced such reliance and a consequent 
detrimental change of position; and fourth, injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.5 
The fourth element, which will be referred to as the justice 
element, is the subject matter of this Article.6  The first Part 
explores the current case law and scholarship in this matter.  
This Part concludes that justice is considered an insignificant 
element of promissory estoppel in both contract literature and 
court opinions, and it links this conclusion to the insignificant 
role of promissory estoppel in contract law in general.  The 
second Part suggests that justice should play a more prominent 
and meaningful role in promissory estoppel by adopting a theory 
of distributive justice.  Thus, justice requires not only balancing 
between the promisee and the promisor, but also that social 
 
1 Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 
HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1265 (1998). 
2 Section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides: 
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or 
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does 
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only 
by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be 
limited as justice requires. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); see also id. § 139; id. § 139 cmt. 
a (“This Section is complementary to § 90 . . . .”). 
3 Orit Gan, Promissory Estoppel: A Call for a More Inclusive Contract Law, 16 J. 
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 47, 53 (2013). 
4 Id. at 56; see also ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW 44 
(1997); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 233 (2004). 
5 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.19, at 167 (3d ed. 
2004); ERIC MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 8.9, at 29 (Joseph M. Perillo 
ed., rev. ed. 1996) [hereinafter HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS]. 
6 For justice in contract law, see generally Peter A. Alces, On Discovering 
Doctrine: “Justice” in Contract Agreement, 83 WASH. U.L.Q. 471 (2005). 
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considerations and public policy—such as the power dynamics 
between the parties, their relations, and the allocative 
implications—should be taken into account.  Accordingly, courts 
should actively promote justice in the formation of contract 
process rather than minimally preventing injustice by enforcing 
the promise.  This is not only a change in the application of 
promissory estoppel; a robust justice element will also lead to 
making promissory estoppel a more meaningful doctrine of 
contract formation. 
Consider Dickens v. Equifax Services Inc.7 as an example.  
An employee was made an offer to relocate from Phoenix to 
Denver.8  His supervisor promised that he would be promoted if 
he moved, that he would be a manager, that he would receive 
annual pay increases and annual bonuses, that the amount of his 
bonus would compensate for the loss of his wife’s income, and 
that he would continue to have a career with the company until 
age sixty-five.9  In reliance on this promise, the employee gave up 
his job in Phoenix and sold his home.10  His wife quit her job, and 
they moved to Denver.11  Subsequently, he was terminated on his 
fifty-fifth birthday.12  The court dismissed his promissory 
estoppel claim, concluding that the supervisor’s statements were 
not sufficiently definite to be legally enforceable promises for 
purposes of establishing promissory estoppel.13  These statements 
were little more than vague assurances or unsupported 
predictions, and thus the employee’s reliance on these statements 
was unreasonable.14  The court did not consider whether 
enforcing the promise was warranted to prevent injustice. 
This decision is problematic since it does not protect 
employees and it allows employers to benefit from an employee’s 
change of position, which is based on the employer’s promise, and 
later deny the promise.15  In contrast, this Article concludes that 
such promises should be enforced.  This Article proposes that the 
 
7 No. 95-1217, 1996 WL 192973 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996). 
8 Id. at *1. 
9 Id. at *1, *5. 
10 Id. at *1. 
11 Id. at *5. 
12 Id. at *1. 
13 Id. at *6. 
14 Id. 
15 Robert A. Hillman, The Unfulfilled Promise of Promissory Estoppel in the 
Employment Setting, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 27 (1999). 
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court should have considered the power imbalance between the 
parties and the long-term employment.16  The court should have 
taken into account not only the employer’s promise and the 
employee’s reliance, but also their relations and the power 
dynamics between the parties.  The court should have used the 
justice element to promote justice by accepting the employee’s 
promissory estoppel claim.  Rather than maintaining the power 
relations between employees and employers, the courts should 
police misuse of power and actively promote more egalitarian 
employment relations.  This will not only empower the employees 
vis-a-vis the employers, but it will also enable employees to 
enforce the promises made to them.17  Thus, employees will be 
able to rely on employers’ promises and to benefit from contracts. 
The contribution of this Article is threefold.  First, it 
critiques the current case law for ignoring and neglecting the 
justice element of promissory estoppel.  This goes against the 
specific wording of section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts and also against promissory estoppel’s rationale and 
purpose.  Contrary to this approach, this Article suggests a 
robust justice element based on a theory of distributive justice. 
Second, a more robust justice element will make the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel more meaningful.  This will result in 
better protecting reliance, furthering trust and cooperation 
among parties, empowering disadvantaged parties, and making 
the formation of contract a more flexible and conscience process.  
Furthermore, this author’s previous Article, Promissory Estoppel: 
A Call for a More Inclusive Contract Law, advocated the 
importance of promissory estoppel18 and stressed that this 
doctrine serves to police power imbalances between parties.  
More generally, it enables underprivileged promisees19 to enforce 
promises and to benefit from contracts.  Accordingly, it makes 
contract law more inclusive by enforcing rather than excluding 
these promises.  This Article is a follow-up article dealing with 
how this can work in practice, meaning how promissory estoppel  
 
16 Mr. Dickens was employed by Equifax Services, Inc. for thirty-two years from 
1960 until 1993. Dickens, 1996 WL 192973, at *1. 
17 Dickens did not base his claim on breach of contract. Id. 
18 Gan, supra note 3, at 52. 
19 I use the term underprivileged to mean parties lacking in bargaining power, 
which are often times poor or minority people but not necessarily. For example, 
employees usually have less bargaining power than employers though the employees 
may be white, educated, and middle class. 
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should become a more meaningful doctrine.  This Article suggests 
that a robust justice element will make promissory estoppel a 
more significant doctrine of contract formation. 
Third, this Article suggests a novel rationale for applying 
distributive justice in contract law.  While many scholars negate 
the arguments against such application, this Article offers a 
different approach to supporting distributive justice 
consideration under a contract law doctrine.  In her previous 
article, this author shows how promissory estoppel has a 
disparate impact on different social groups.20  That article argues 
that promissory estoppel is mainly used by underprivileged 
promisees, such as employees.  Since these promisees cannot 
satisfy the consideration requirement, they cannot claim breach 
of contract; as such, promissory estoppel is their only way to 
enforce the promises made to them.  Building on this groups-
based analysis, this Article argues that promissory estoppel 
should apply distributive justice considerations.  Because 
promissory estoppel is applied differently by different social 
groups, this doctrine should address these allocative 
consequences. 
I. JUSTICE—AN INSIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF PROMISSORY 
ESTOPPEL 
This Part briefly outlines promissory estoppel case law and 
scholarship on the matter of the justice element.  It explores the 
following questions:  What does avoiding injustice “only by 
enforcment of the promise” mean?  How do courts interpret this?  
What theories of justice do they use?  What is the relation 
between the justice element and the other three elements of the 
promissory estoppel doctrine?  This Part establishes that justice 
is an insignificant, sometimes even ignored, element of 
promissory estoppel.  This conclusion is related to a more general 
phenomenon, which is that promissory estoppel is considered an 
insignificant doctrine of contract formation. 
 
 
20 Gan, supra note 3, at 102. 
FINAL_GAN 10/16/2015 2:49 PM 
60 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:55   
A. Avoiding Injustice 
Although this Article uses the term “the justice element,” 
according to section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
the aim of promissory estoppel is to avoid injustice.  The wording 
of section 90 seems to minimize the function of the promissory 
estoppel doctrine.  First, enforcing promises under this doctrine 
should be used only as a last resort.  The court will enforce a 
promise only to avoid injustice; however, if the court can achieve 
this goal by another means or if no injustice is expected, then the 
promise should not be enforced.  Second, the court is not required 
to actively promote justice in contract formation, but rather to 
minimally avoid injustice.21  Rather than affirmatively and 
effectively pursuing justice, the courts make do with only 
preventing injustice.  Thus, section 90 inserts only a limited 
notion of equity and justice into the contracting process. 
B. An Ignored Element 
The justice element of promissory estoppel has received little 
attention by judges.22  While focusing mainly on the promise 
made by the promisor and on the reliance by the promisee, many 
opinions neglect the justice element of this doctrine.23  As a 
recent empirical study of promissory estoppel cases concluded, 
“[M]ost judges require the existence of both promise and reliance 
before allowing a promissory estoppel claim to proceed, although 
surprisingly few judges speak in terms of ‘equity’ or ‘justice.’ ”24  
For example, one opinion states: 
 
21 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992) (“It is perhaps 
worth noting that the test is not whether the promise should be enforced to do 
justice, but whether enforcement is required to prevent an injustice. As has been 
observed elsewhere, it is easier to recognize an unjust result than a just one, 
particularly in a morally ambiguous situation.”). 
22 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, § 2.19, at 180 (“This vague qualification has been 
discussed in relatively few cases.”); see JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON 
CONTRACTS 312 (5th ed. 2011) (“There is very little discussion of this requirement in 
the case law.”). 
23 ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 220 (3d ed. 
2002) (“In most cases, courts ignore this third element in promissory estoppel and 
focus instead on whether a clear and definite promise was made and whether the 
promisee reasonable [sic] relied on the promise.”). 
24 Marco J. Jimenez, The Many Faces of Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical 
Analysis Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 57 UCLA L. REV. 669, 672 
(2010). For a discussion on these findings, see id. at 702–04. 
FINAL_GAN 10/16/2015 2:49 PM 
2015] JUSTICE ELEMENT OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 61 
The doctrine of promissory estoppel which will create a cause of 
action has two fundamental elements which must be proved by 
the plaintiff.  First, there must be proof that there actually was 
a promise and, second, that the plaintiff relied upon that 
promise and took action to his detriment.25 
This court completely ignored the justice element and reduced 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to two elements.26 
Some judges stress that promissory estoppel is an equitable 
doctrine that gives the courts discretion in its application.27  
However, they do not further discuss how this discretion should 
be exercised and what theory of justice should be applied.  Other 
judges contend that when the promise and reliance prongs are 
 
25 Haveg Corp. v. Guyer, 226 A.2d 231, 236–37 (Del. 1967); see also Metro. 
Convoy Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 208 A.2d 519, 521 (Del. 1965); Martin-Senour Paints 
v. Delmarva Venture Corp., No. CIV.A. 86C-JA11, 1988 WL 25376, at *2 (Del. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 1988). 
26 See Cha Plake Holdings, Ltd. v. Chrysler Corp., No. 94C-04-164-JOH, 2002 
Del. Super. LEXIS 31, at *133–37 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, Chrysler Corp. v. Chaplake Holdings, Ltd., 822 A.2d 1024 (Del. 2003). The 
court’s instructions to the jury included this element of promissory estoppel: 
“Plaintiffs were injured by acting or refraining from acting in reliance upon 
Chrysler’s promises.” Id. at 111. Chrysler argued that the court should have 
included an additional element according to which “the promise is binding because 
injustice can only be avoided by its enforcement.” Id. at 134. The court rejected this 
argument, holding: 
First, this proffered additional element is not part of an action at law for 
promissory estoppel. Second, in a dispute not involving an employment 
situation, the element of preventing injustice is not one that need be 
proven. . . . What the Supreme Court said in Quimby is not that avoiding 
injustice is an element to be proven but is the policy underpinning for the 
cause of action for promissory estoppel. For these reasons, the Court did 
not err by not including this manifest injustice element in its instructions. 
But, the facts of this case are a good example of the policy behind the cause 
of action. 
Id. at 134, 136–37; see Chrysler Corp., 822 A.2d at 1034 (“The prevention of injustice 
is the ‘fundamental idea’ underlying the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 
Accordingly, the trial judge implicitly found that this element was satisfied, and the 
court did not err by failing to submit this element of the Lord test to the jury.” 
(citation omitted)). 
27 See, e.g., US Ecology, Inc. v. State, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 894, 901–02 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005); Scott v. Savers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 663 N.W.2d 715, 729–30 (Wis. 2003) 
(“When making a policy decision under the third element of the promissory estoppel 
test—that is, determining whether an injustice can be avoided by enforcing the 
promise—a court ‘must remember all of its powers, derived from equity, law 
merchant, and other sources, as well as the common law. Its decree should be 
molded accordingly.’ . . . Permitting the plaintiffs to obtain damages from an 
immune public official through the back door opened by a claim of promissory 
estoppel contravenes the government immunity policy of this State set forth . . . and 
consequently would not serve the ends of justice.”). 
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met, then the justice prong is also satisfied.28  Thus, the justice 
element is redundant and is established by a showing of 
detrimental reliance on a clear and unambiguous promise.  
Contrary to the specific language of section 90 that requires 
courts to examine whether enforcement is warranted to prevent 
injustice, courts rarely consider justice in their holdings. 
Scholarly literature has similarly only rarely addressed the 
justice prong of promissory estoppel.  Some scholars categorize 
promissory estoppel as a promise-based or assent-based liability, 
while others categorize promissory estoppel as reliance-based 
liability.29  Consequently, in spite of this difference of opinion, 
both schools of thought tend to focus mainly on the promise and 
on the reliance elements of the doctrine, respectively.30  
Furthermore, even scholars who categorize promissory estoppel 
as an equitable doctrine do not give a full and adequate analysis 
of justice.31  They give only a general theoretical notion of the 
doctrine’s equitable character.  For example, Holmes uses terms 
like good faith, conscience, honesty, and equity rather than 
justice to stress the equitable nature of promissory estoppel.32  
According to Holmes: 
 
28 MURRAY, supra note 22 (“The requirement appears conclusory once it is 
shown that a party justifiably relied on a promise and the promisor reasonably 
expected such reliance.”); see also Heffron v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., No. A11-
2039, 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 741, at *18 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2012) 
(“[T]he district court’s findings that appellant made a clear and definite promise and 
that respondents’ reliance was reasonable are not clearly erroneous. We conclude 
that these findings support the district court’s conclusion that the promise must be 
enforced to prevent injustice.”); Chester Creek Techs., Inc. v. Kessler, No. A06-505, 
2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6, at *14 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 2, 2007) (“Taking as 
true the jury’s determinations that Chester Creek made a clear and definite 
promise; that Chester Creek intended for Kessler to rely on it; and that Kessler did 
in fact rely on it, we conclude that the district court did not err when it concluded 
that enforcement of the promise was necessary to prevent injustice.”); Baldwin v. 
Aurora Health Care, Inc., No. 00-1006, 2001 WI App 75, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 
2001) (“Baldwin’s termination of her practice was reasonable in light of the jury’s 
finding that a promise was made and Baldwin reasonably relied on it. It was 
reasonably foreseeable by Aurora that Baldwin would terminate her practice given 
her clear expression of interest in leaving direct patient care in favor of ADCP work, 
which the jury found Aurora offered. The injustice factors of U.S. Oil are satisfied in 
this case.”). 
29 See, e.g., Gan, supra note 3, at 56. 
30 Id. at 56, 60. 
31 Id. at 62. 
32 Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement of Promissory Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 263, 515–16 (1996). 
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With its equitable underpinnings—good faith, conscience, 
honesty, and equity—promissory estoppel recognizes the 
promisee’s right to reasonably rely, arising from the reasonable 
expectations created and foreseeable by the promisor.  The 
promisor’s statements and manifestations must objectively 
evidence a sufficient commitment or assurance on which a 
reasonable person foreseeably would rely.  In such a case, the 
promisor has a duty to prevent a promisee’s detrimental 
reliance.  The remedy for breach is discretionary and 
personalized, predicated on the principles and standards of good 
faith, conscience, honesty, and equity.  A promisee or third 
party recovering under promissory estoppel should neither be 
penalized nor experience a windfall.33 
Similarly, Charles Knapp observes: 
Section 90 also contains a requirement that the situation be 
such that “injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.”  From the wording of the section, it appears that the 
reference to injustice is not simply a verbal summation of all the 
elements that have been listed so far.  Rather it is an additional 
element, distinct from the others.  Even if a promise has 
induced foreseeable, substantial and reasonable reliance, 
meeting all the specific tests imposed by section 90, the final 
question must still be answered.  Will injustice result from its 
nonenforcement?  To the drafters of section 90, this is an open 
question—the answer will often be yes, but it can be no.34 
Thus, though Knapp and other scholars acknowledge that 
justice is an independent element of promissory estoppel, they 
fall short of specifying what justice means and what theory of 
justice should be applied under section 90. 
C. Corrective Justice 
The few court opinions that have discussed the justice 
element of promissory estoppel have concluded that justice 
means corrective justice.35  In contrast to distributive justice,36 
 
33 Id. 
34 Knapp, supra note 1, at 1264 (footnote omitted); see also HOLMES, CORBIN ON 
CONTRACTS, supra note 5, § 8.9, at 33. 
35 Holmes, supra note 32, at 276 (“Presently, reliance consideration has its own 
autonomous sphere of influence as an evolving equitable principle for enforcing the 
right to rely on certain promises and for designing relief to afford corrective justice 
between parties.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 307–08 (Alaska), at 315 
(Arizona), at 318 (Arkansas), at 322, 327, 331, 339 (California), at 343 (Colorado), at 
353 (Delaware), at 363 (Florida), at 413 (New Jersey), at 425 (New York), at 433 
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corrective justice deals only with balancing between the promisor 
and the promisee37 and it ignores social aspects of the contract 
and policy considerations.38  Under a corrective justice approach, 
one party has to compensate the other for the damage she 
caused.39  Put differently, the promisor was unjustly enriched as 
a result of the promisee’s reliance.  In applying this notion of 
justice, these judges mainly weigh the loss caused to the 
promisee due to her reliance on the promise but also the 
promisor’s situation.40  For example, one court explained: 
 
 
(North Carolina), at 446 (Pennsylvania), at 464 (Texas). James Gordley asserts that 
cases applying the consideration and promissory estoppel doctrines can be explained 
by “Aristotelian ideas of commutative justice and liberality.” Accordingly, Gordley 
states: 
[Courts’] decisions do not turn on whether the parties made a bargain or 
the promisee relied or the offeree assented. They turn on the effect of the 
transaction on the distribution of wealth between the parties. Promises 
that enrich the promisee at the promisor’s expense are not enforced, unless 
the promisor intended to enrich him and there is some reason to think the 
promisor’s decision is sensible and will change the distribution of wealth for 
the better. 
James Gordley, Enforcing Promises, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 547, 548 (1995). 
36 Distributive justice is discussed further in Part II.C. 
37 Carolyn Edwards, Promissory Estoppel and the Avoidance of Injustice, 12 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 223, 248–49 (1987) (“Without a doubt, the success which the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel has enjoyed in the last two decades has provided the 
foundation and the encouragement for the development of new rules which are 
designed  to achieve fairness between parties to a bargain contract.”); see also Trans-
World Int’l, Inc. v. Smith-Hemion Prods., 972 F. Supp. 1275, 1288 (C.D. Cal. 1997) 
(considering the behaviors of both parties). 
38 For corrective justice in contract law, see, for example, Eyal Zamir, The 
Missing Interest: Restoration of the Contractual Equivalence, 93 VA. L. REV. 59, 108–
112 (2007). For distributive justice, see, for example, id. at 112–16; see also Peter 
Benson, The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its Relation to Distributive Justice, 77 
IOWA L. REV. 515, 535–47 (1992); Curtis Bridgeman, Note, Corrective Justice in 
Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages?, 56 VAND. L. REV. 237, 252–60 
(2003); Menachem Mautner, “The Eternal Triangles of the Law”: Toward a Theory of 
Priorities in Conflicts Involving Remote Parties, 90 MICH. L. REV. 95, 103–06 (1991). 
39 See Zamir, supra note 38, at 108. 
40 Michael B. Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Reliance 
on Illusory Promises, 44 SW. L.J. 841, 849 (1990) (“Although the main focus of this 
open-ended requirement appears to be the harm the promisee would suffer in the 
event of nonenforcement, consideration of the promisor’s position is implicitly part of 
the process of determining the nature of his promise and the substantiality of the 
reliance it produced.”); see also Snyder v. Snyder, 558 A.2d 412, 417 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1989) (“One of the most significant factors in determining whether justice 
demands enforcement of the promise is whether the promisor acted 
unconscionably.”), cert. denied, 564 A.2d 1182 (1989). 
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Defendant’s fifth ‘essential element of estoppel’ refers to a 
‘weighing of all the equities.’  If by that is meant a 
mathematical comparison of potential disadvantages to the 
respective parties depending on whether the promise is or is not 
enforced, the proposition is unsound.  The question is not which 
party will suffer the greater detriment if the contention of the 
other prevails.  That is not the rule of promissory estoppel—
estoppel that arises when an innocent promisee relies, to his 
disadvantage, upon a promise intended or reasonably calculated 
to induce action by him.  In such case equity is first concerned 
with the plight of the innocent promisee if the promisor be 
permitted to seek asylum within the protection of the statute of 
frauds. . . .  Vander Wal attempted to measure any threatened 
damage to plaintiffs’ home at ‘from fifty to seventy-five per cent 
of its present value.’  But we agree with him ‘the damage cannot 
be evaluated in dollars and cents.’  That fact merely fortifies the 
jurisdiction of equity to restrain this threatened wrong.  An 
injury is said to be irreparable where there exists no certain 
pecuniary standad [sic] for measuring the damage.  We think 
the record shows that here, in the language of the Restatement, 
‘injustice can be avoided only by enforcement’ of the promise 
upon which plaintiffs relied.  While the threatened injustice to 
the promisee is equity’s first consideration, it is proper to 
consider the possible harshness to defendant by enforcement of 
his promise.41 
In order to have the promise enforced, the promisee has to 
convince the court that enforcing the promise would prevent her 
unjust injury.  Accordingly: 
The authorities are not in accord on the precise meaning of the 
injustice requirement.  Some courts have ruled that it is 
sufficient that the reliance be detrimental in the consideration 
sense; others have insisted that the reliance be injurious to the 
promisee.  Logically, injury is required; without injury there 
would be no injustice in not enforcing the promise.  As Judge 
Posner has indicated, the doctrine requires that the promisee 
incur a real cost.42 
 
41 Miller v. Lawlor, 66 N.W.2d 267, 274 (Iowa 1954) (citations omitted). 
42 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 221 (6th ed. 
2009) (footnotes omitted); see also Burton v. GMC, No. 1:95-cv-1054-DFH-TAB, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62758, at *39 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2008) (The court’s instructions to 
the jury regarding the elements of promissory estoppel included the following: “that 
the plaintiff suffered a financial loss because General Motors broke the promise, and 
an award of damages for breaking the promise is needed to avoid what would 
otherwise be an injustice.”); Indus. Maxifreight Servs., LLC v. Tenneco Auto. 
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If, however, no such loss or injury can be shown, the 
promissory estoppel claim is rejected.43  For example, in one case, 
 
Operating Co., 182 F. Supp. 2d 630, 636 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (“Michigan courts apply 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel cautiously, and only where the facts are 
unquestionable and the wrong to be prevented undoubted.”); Kattke v. Indep. Order 
of Foresters, No. 00-276 ADM/AJB, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23232, at *13 (D. Minn. 
May 22, 2001), aff’d, 30 F. App’x. 660 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Especially where the promise 
alleged is ‘at-will’ employment, there must be some tangible detriment for a finding 
of injustice.”); Hoffmann v. Boone, 708 F. Supp. 78, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that 
the party asserting promissory estoppel as a defense to the statute of frauds must 
demonstrate unconscionable injury); Laks v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn., 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 836, 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are 
“(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom 
the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and 
(4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.”); Kiely v. St. 
Germain, 670 P.2d 764, 767 (Colo. 1983) (“The doctrine of promissory estoppel 
encourages fair dealing in business relationships and discourages conduct which 
unreasonably causes foreseeable economic loss because of action or inaction induced 
by a specific promise.”); CBA Collection Servs. v. Potter, No. 95A-10-023-RRC, 1996 
Del. Super. LEXIS 357, at *17 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1996) (“Promissory estoppel 
which creates a cause of action requires 1) a promise, 2) reliance on that promise, 
and 3) injury to the party relying on that promise.”); Conrad v. Fields, No. A06-1387, 
2007 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 744, at *14 (Minn. Ct. App. July 24, 2007) 
(“Appellant argues that because respondent received a valuable law degree, she did 
not suffer any real detriment by relying on his promise. But receiving a law degree 
was the expected and intended consequence of appellant’s promise, and the essence 
of appellant’s promise was that respondent would receive the law degree without the 
debt associated with attending law school. Although respondent benefited from 
attending law school, the debt that she incurred in reliance on appellant’s promise is 
a detriment to her.”); Geisinger v. A & B Farms, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1991) (“Without injury there is no injustice by not enforcing the promise.”); 
Hellenbrand v. Goodman, 2003 WI App 162, at *38 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003) (“Although 
none of the elements of promissory estoppel expressly require that the broken 
promise be a cause of harm to the plaintiff, such a requirement is plainly a part of 
the ‘avoidance of injustice’ inquiry encompassed by the third element.”). 
43 See, e.g., Local 107 Office & Prof’l Emps. Int’l Union v. Offshore Logistics, 
Inc., 380 F.3d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (“In this case, the Union did not 
suffer any harm as a result of Offshore’s failure to implement the 2002 pay 
increases.”); Brock & Co. v. Kings Row Assocs., No. 04-cv-2096, 2004 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 26340, at *9 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (rejecting promissory estoppel claim because 
promisee benefitted from the relationship with promisor); State v. First Nat’l Bank 
of Ketchikan, 629 P.2d 78, 81 (Alaska 1981) (“Even taken in the light most favorable 
to the Bank, the evidence introduced at trial leads us to the conclusion that 
enforcement of the State’s promise is not necessary in the interest of justice. Under 
the circumstances, we must agree with the State’s claim that the real cause of the 
Bank’s loss was its misplaced reliance on Jones, not the materiality of the State’s 
promise to the Bank. It is undisputed that had Jones proven to be the trustworthy 
businessman that the Bank believed he was, the State’s failure to perform its 
promise would have resulted in nothing more than a two-week delay in the closing of 
its loan to Jones. And it is clear that, as Taylor conceded, a two-week delay was ‘no 
big concern.’ Since we are convinced that the Bank’s loss was caused by its own 
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though both the promise element and the reliance element of 
promissory estoppel were satisfied, the court concluded:  
In generic terms, the promise to appellant was one that a 
benefit would probably be given and that it would probably be 
given to appellant.  We can find no precedent for application of 
the doctrine of promissory estoppel to enforce a promise with 
benefits as uncertain as these, and we conclude that this is not 
the kind of commitment calling for special judicial action in the 
name of avoiding injustice.44 
The Restatement’s comments also take the view that, under 
the justice prong, the court should consider the detriment and 
the promisee’s loss, the promisee’s reliance and the unjust 
enrichment of the promisor, and the promisor’s promise.45  The 
comment provides: 
The promisor is affected only by reliance which he does or 
should foresee, and enforcement must be necessary to avoid 
injustice.  Satisfaction of the latter requirement may depend on 
the reasonableness of the promisee’s reliance, on its definite and 
substantial character in relation to the remedy sought, on the 
formality with which the promise is made, on the extent to 
which the evidentiary, cautionary, deterrent and channeling 
functions of form are met by the commercial setting or 
otherwise, and on the extent to which such other policies as the 
enforcement of bargains and the prevention of unjust 
enrichment are relevant.46 
 
 
erroneous judgment as to Jones’s character rather than by its reliance on the State’s 
promise, we do not believe that justice would be served by requiring the State to 
bear the loss occasioned when Jones absconded with $30,000 on loan from the 
Bank.”); Kiley v. First Nat’l Bank, 649 A.2d 1145, 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) 
(“Given that the Kileys had the benefit of the BFF terms for some five years, justice 
certainly does not compel application of promissory estoppel.”); Filippi v. Filippi, 818 
A.2d 608, 627 (R.I. 2003) (“[S]he suffered no detriment. . . . Under these 
circumstances we refuse to find such detriment that justice requires enforcement of 
the alleged contract.”); Barnes & Robinson Co. v. Onesource Facility Servs., 195 
S.W.3d 637, 645 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (“No injustice arises in the refusal to enforce 
a promise where either the loss induced is negligible or the promisee’s reliance is not 
reasonable.”). 
44 Faimon v. Winona State Univ., 540 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); 
see also In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., Nos. 00-10992, 00-10993, 00-10995, Civ.A.02-
0335, 2002 WL 1874836, at *6 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2002); Worlds v. Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp., No. 90-C-0643, 1990 WL 129346, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 1990). 
45 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b (1981). 
46 Id. 
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Though the Restatement opens the door for policy 
considerations under the justice requirement, such as the 
enforcement of bargains and prevention of unjust enrichment, it 
stops short of introducing distribution aspects and other social 
issues into the equation.47  Thus, promissory estoppel aims to 
provide a remedy to the promisee for her loss or to have the 
promisor pay the promisee due to the promisor’s wrongful 
enrichment.48  The only consideration under the justice analysis 
is the parties’ respective situations and conduct, but other 
societal and distributive considerations are beyond the scope of 
this doctrine.49  This approach is not neutral; rather, it has 
distributive results—it maintains rather than mitigates power 
dynamics between the parties.  In other words, by not 
intervening, it favors the dominant party. 
D. The Remedy 
Justice is not only an element of promissory estoppel; it also 
applies to the remedy.50  According to section 90 of Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, “[t]he remedy granted for breach may be 
limited as justice requires.”51  The First Restatement did not 
 
47 See id. § 139(2) (“In determining whether injustice can be avoided only by 
enforcement of the promise, the following circumstances are significant: (a) the 
availability and adequacy of other remedies, particularly cancellation and 
restitution; (b) the definite and substantial character of the action or forbearance in 
relation to the remedy sought; (c) the extent to which the action or forbearance 
corroborates evidence of the making and terms of the promise, or the making and 
terms are otherwise established by clear and convincing evidence; (d) the 
reasonableness of the action or forbearance; (e) the extent to which the action or 
forbearance was foreseeable by the promisor.”); see also id. § 139 cmt. b (“Like § 90 
this Section states a flexible principle, but the requirement of consideration is more 
easily displaced than the requirement of a writing. The reliance must be foreseeable 
by the promisor, and enforcement must be necessary to avoid injustice. Subsection 
(2) lists some of the relevant factors in applying the latter requirement. Each factor 
relates either to the extent to which reliance furnishes a compelling substantive 
basis for relief in addition to the expectations created by the promise or to the extent 
to which the circumstances satisfy the evidentiary purpose of the Statute and fulfill 
any cautionary, deterrent and channeling functions it may serve.”). 
48 See, e.g., Faimon, 540 N.W.2d at 883 (“Numerous considerations enter into a 
judicial determination of injustice, including the reasonableness of a promisee’s 
reliance and a weighing of public policies in favor of both enforcing bargains and 
preventing unjust enrichment.”); see also Panasonic Commc’ns & Sys. v. State Dep’t 
of Admin., Bureau of Purchases, 691 A.2d 190, 196 (Me. 1997). 
49 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. b. 
50 See id. § 90. 
51 Id. For the causation element, see US Ecology, Inc. v. State, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
894, 896 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A]s in ordinary contract actions, a plaintiff seeking 
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include this part, which was added in the Second Restatement.52  
This language gives courts discretion to tailor the damages to the 
specific circumstances in order to achieve a just remedy.53  But in 
practice, courts apply their discretion in a limited manner.  Court 
opinions and scholars have interpreted this provision to mean 
that the usual remedy is expectation damages, meaning full 
contractual damages.  However, in some cases, justice requires 
that damages be limited to the reliance interest of the promisee.54  
In other words, promissory estoppel generally awards 
expectation damages similar to breach of contract damages, but 
because of its equitable nature, it gives the courts discretion to 
award reliance damages. 
The Restatement’s comments provide that “relief may 
sometimes be limited to restitution or to damages or specific 
relief measured by the extent of the promisee’s reliance rather 
than by the terms of the promise.”55  However, courts tend to 
 
recovery on a promissory estoppel theory must prove that the defendant’s breach 
was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s damages.”). 
52 For limiting damages as justice requires, see generally W. F. Young, Half 
Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19, 24–30 (1981). 
53 Holmes, supra note 32, at 295–96 (“The remedy for promissory estoppel is 
discretionary. No rigid or mechanical remedy rule applies. The remedy is not 
necessarily co-extensive with damages for contract breach, but is equitably molded 
ad hoc for each case according to the dictates of good faith, conscience, and justice. 
With their reliance sabers, courts award the full range of remedies based on specific 
performance, restitution, expectation, reliance, exemplary (seldom), or some other 
appropriate relief to achieve corrective justice between the parties in the context of 
their distinct litigation.” (footnotes omitted)); HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, 
supra note 5, § 8.8, at 21 (“There is no reason why the courts of the present day 
should not ‘make the remedy fit the crime’ and make the amount of a judgment for 
damages depend upon the special circumstances and the merits of the claims of all 
existing claimants.”); see also Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 276 
(Wis. 1965) (“Where damages are awarded in promissory estoppel instead of 
specifically enforcing the promisor’s promise, they should be only such as in the 
opinion of the court are necessary to prevent injustice. Mechanical or rule of thumb 
approaches to the damage problem should be avoided.”). 
54 FARNSWORTH, supra note 5, at 180 (“Even if the requirements for 
enforceability of a promise are met, the Restatement Second states that recovery 
‘may be limited as justice requires,’ language that is generally invoked in limiting 
recovery to damages based on the reliance interest.”); see also Baldwin v. Aurora 
Health Care, Inc., No. 00-1006, 2001 WI App. 75, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2001) 
(“The amount of damages ‘may be determined by the plaintiff's expenditures or 
change of position in reliance as well as by the value to him of the promised 
performance.’ ”). 
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 cmt. d (1981). 
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award either expectation damages or reliance damages,56 and 
they generally do not award other remedies, such as specific 
performance or restitution.57  For example, one court stated: 
An equity court possesses some discretionary power to award 
damages in order to do complete justice.  Furthermore, since it 
is the historic purpose of equity to secure complete justice, the 
courts are able to adjust the remedies so as to grant the 
necessary relief, and a district court sitting in equity may even 
devise a remedy which extends or exceeds the terms of a prior 
agreement between the parties, if it is necessary to make the 
injured party whole.  Since promissory estoppel is an equitable 
matter, the trial court has broad power in its choice of a 
remedy.58 
The opinion then stated that the court has discretion to choose 
from a broad range of remedies; however, it only debated 
whether to award the lost profits or the expenditures in reliance 
on the promise.59  It did not consider other remedies beyond 
expectation damages or reliance damages.60 
It is interesting to note that, with regard to the remedy, the 
Restatement uses the term “justice” rather than injustice.61  
Despite this linguistic difference, however, the courts use limited 
discretion with regard to the remedy.  Similarly, the courts give a 
narrow interpretation to, and limitedly use, the doctrine’s justice 
element, as demonstrated above.62 
 
56 For expectation damages see, for example, Gan, supra note 3, at 59. For 
reliance damages see, for example, Gan, supra note 3, at 61. 
57 Walters v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 1098, 1100–01 (7th Cir. 1981). 
58 Id. at 1100 (citations omitted); see also D & G Stout, Inc. v. Bacardi Imps., 
Inc., 923 F.2d 566, 569 (7th Cir. 1991) (debating whether to award expectation 
damages or reliance damages); D & G Stout v. Bacardi Imports, 805 F. Supp. 1434, 
1451 (N.D. Ind. 1992) (debating whether to award expectation damages or reliance 
damages); Tynan v. JBVBB, LLC, 743 N.W.2d 730, 734–35 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007) 
(debating whether to award expectation damages or reliance damages). 
59 Walters, 642 F.2d at 1100–01. 
60 See Burton v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 95-CV-1054, 2008 WL 3853329, at *19 
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 15, 2008) (“There is no simple answer to the question of what type of 
damages are appropriate as a remedy for promissory estoppel. The court concludes 
that under federal common law, the court and/or the jury has the discretion to 
fashion the remedy needed to avoid injustice based on a promissory estoppel claim, 
which can include either expectation damages or reliance damages.”). 
61 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981) (“The remedy granted for 
breach may be limited as justice requires.”). 
62 See Part I.B. 
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E. Why Is Justice Unimportant? 
Some contract law scholars have observed that the current 
trend in contract law is toward a formalist, conservative contract 
law similar to classical contract law.63  Reflecting this trend, 
courts are moving away from a looser, open-textured approach 
toward a more restrictive approach that emphasizes definitions, 
categories, and bright-line rule formulations.64  In addition, 
courts embrace a more formal, abstract, inflexible, and  
rule-oriented application of contract law.65  Courts also rely 
heavily on freedom of contract and embrace values such as 
respect for market exchange and disapproval of state 
intervention.66  This results in empowering economically 
dominant parties rather than mitigating power imbalance 
between the parties. 
This trend explains why promissory estoppel is considered by 
many scholars to be an insignificant doctrine of contract 
formation.67  But this trend also explains why the justice prong is 
 
63 JAY M. FEINMAN, UN-MAKING LAW: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO ROLL 
BACK THE COMMON LAW 78–127 (2004). But see Daniela Caruso, Contract Law and 
Distribution in the Age of Welfare Reform, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 665, 666–68 (2007); 
Sidney W. DeLong, Placid, Clear-Seeming Words: Some Realism About the New 
Formalism (with Particular Reference to Promissory Estoppel), 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
13, 17 (2001); Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for 
Individual Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 674–78 (2009). 
64 Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. 
REV. 1131, 1133 (1995). See generally Suzanne B. Goldberg, Social Justice 
Movements and LatCrit Community: On Making Anti-Essentialist and Social 
Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629, 643–44 (2002) (“[T]he 
traditionally embraced view of an impartial judiciary carefully applying neutral 
legal principles is itself mythic and illusory. The business of judging, even in the 
most desiccated breach of contract case, always calls for decisions regarding a 
party’s fit into a legally (i.e., socially) constructed category. In contract law, as in 
anti-discrimination law, society has determined, and then expressed through legal 
regulation, under what conditions an injured party deserves a remedy. Yet somehow 
this judicial undertaking seems less fraught with difficulty in a contract dispute, 
perhaps because although the rules related to relief are socially/legally constructed, 
they do not seek to embody extant traits but instead shuffle people in and out of the 
class entitled to recover for breach of contract according to specific criteria defined 
by law (e.g., existence of a valid contract, breach, damages).” (footnote omitted)). 
65 Robert A. Hillman, The “New Conservatism” in Contract Law and the Process 
of Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879, 879–80 (1999); see also Jay M. Feinman, Un-
Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2004). 
66 Mooney, supra note 64, at 1134 (“The most fundamental conception returning 
to dominate contract law today is ‘freedom of contract.’ ”). 
67 Gan, supra note 3, at 65. 
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considered unimportant.  Courts disfavor standards such as 
justice and adhere to formal and strict contracting rules.68  
Courts are also less inclined to use equitable doctrines to protect 
underprivileged parties.69  As a result, courts interpret justice 
narrowly and limit the application of promissory estoppel.70 
II. JUSTICE—TOWARD A SIGNIFICANT ELEMENT OF PROMISSORY 
ESTOPPEL 
This Part discusses how courts should interpret and apply 
the justice element of promissory estoppel.  Contrary to the 
current attitude toward this aspect, justice should be considered 
a meaningful element and independent of the other elements of 
promissory estoppel.  In addition, courts should actively promote 
justice in the contracting process by applying a theory of 
distributive justice that goes beyond considerations of the 
interests of the parties.  In particular, courts should consider the 
relations between the parties, the power imbalance between the 
parties, the allocative aspects of the contract, and other public 
policy considerations under the justice prong.  This Part 
advocates for a change in the way the courts use justice in their 
opinions.  This will result in a profound change in the meaning, 
application, and function of the promissory estoppel doctrine.  
Furthermore, it will make promissory estoppel a more robust 
doctrine, which can serve both to protect the reliance of 
underprivileged parties and to empower underprivileged parties 
by providing them with a tool to enforce the promises made to 
them.  This will make the contracting process more flexible, 
egalitarian, and conscionable, and, more generally, it will make 
contract law more inclusive and pluralist. 
 
 
68 Id. (“[C]ourts move away from a looser, open-textured approach toward a 
more restrictive approach emphasizing definitions, categories, and bright-line rule 
formulations.” (citing Mooney, supra note 64, at 1133–34)). 
69 Id. at 79–80 (“However, underprivileged promisees remain at a disadvantage, 
since they often cannot adhere to contract law formalities and form legally binding 
contracts.”). 
70 See Part I.B. 
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A. From Avoiding Injustice to Promoting Justice 
For reasons that are elaborated below,71 this Article suggests 
that the courts use the promissory estoppel doctrine as a means 
to achieve justice in contract formation.  Rather than serving the 
limited role of avoiding injustice in special and extreme cases, the 
promissory estoppel doctrine should aim to actively promote 
justice in the contracting process.  The doctrine of promissory 
estoppel should be used to police misuses of power in 
negotiations.72  In other words, by enforcing promises, the 
promissory estoppel doctrine will correct power imbalances 
between parties, and will empower the weaker party on the one 
hand and prevent the stronger party from denying her promise 
on the other.  Promissory estoppel will prevent harmful behavior 
by the dominant party to the detriment of the other party.  
Accordingly, equitable values will make the formation of contract 
more conscionable and egalitarian.  Rather than adhering to the 
formality of the doctrine of consideration, promissory estoppel 
will enable the courts to counterbalance the rigidity of the 
bargain theory.  Then, promissory estoppel will be a meaningful 
and viable alternative to consideration, with justice at its core. 
This active role of the court is explained by the view that 
power imbalances between parties or relations of trust may 
disadvantage promisees who can only enforce the promises made 
to them by using the doctrine of promissory estoppel.73  The 
formal bargaining process places barriers to forming a contract in 
the way of such promisees; thus, they can turn only to promissory 
estoppel.  Consequently, the justice element of promissory 
estoppel and its equitable nature are important parts of this 
doctrine.  Basing this doctrine only on promise and reliance while 
ignoring the justice element not only empowers the already 
powerful party, but also defies the equitable purpose of the 
promissory estoppel doctrine.  It enables the dominant party to 
enjoy the benefits of her promise and then deny it, while  
 
 
 
71 See infra Part II.C. 
72 Juliet P. Kostritsky, A New Theory of Assent-Based Liability Emerging Under 
the Guise of Promissory Estoppel: An Explanation and Defense, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 
895, 910 (1987); Hillman, supra note 15 (stating courts should use promissory 
estoppel to protect employees). 
73 Gan, supra note 3, at 85. 
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simultaneously leaving the promisee to bear the loss caused by 
her reliance on the promise.  Rather than maintaining the status 
quo, the justice element is a tool to redistribution. 
A robust justice element is desirable from the 
underprivileged parties’ point of view.  However, protecting the 
reliance interest and encouraging mutual trust and cooperation 
between the parties will benefit all parties, including dominant 
parties.  Privileged parties might benefit from exploiting the 
other party by gaining advantage from the latter’s behavior 
based on the promise and later denying their promise.  However, 
this benefit is outweighed by the benefits of a regime of trust and 
cooperation between the contracting parties. 
One might argue that the concept of justice is too vague and 
focusing on it might give courts too much discretion.  Thus, a 
more limited application of justice gives parties the benefit of 
predictable and stable contract law.  However, if the courts begin 
to apply a distributive theory of justice, then, in time, a known 
concept of justice will be developed on which parties can rely.  In 
addition, the courts have used, and have developed, other open-
ended standards such as public policy, unconscionability, and 
good faith.  Thus, the courts are up to the task of developing a 
workable and viable notion of justice under the promissory 
estoppel doctrine. 
One might also argue that according to the words of section 
90, justice has a minor and limited role.  In other words, 
enforcement is restricted by justice considerations to extreme 
cases where “injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the 
promise.”74  However, because of the equitable and important role 
of promissory estoppel as indicated above, and further explored 
below, the courts should give the justice element a more robust 
role.  The weight of the justice element will enable courts to 
achieve the just solution and to include policy considerations in 
the formation process.  Expanding, rather than limiting, 
enforcement of promises using the justice element will serve good 
causes, such as strengthening trust and reliance between the 
parties and policing power imbalances in the bargaining process. 
 
 
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
FINAL_GAN 10/16/2015 2:49 PM 
2015] JUSTICE ELEMENT OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL 75 
Unconscionability doctrine, like promissory estoppel, deals 
with power imbalances between parties;75 however, each doctrine 
serves a different role.  The former gives the court the discretion 
not to enforce an unconscionable term or contract and  
does not relate to enforcing promises.  Although procedural 
unconscionability76 looks at the negotiations and the formation 
process, it does not enable the promisee to enforce a promise.  
Accordingly, both promissory estoppel and unconscionability 
protect the right of underprivileged parties to contract in 
different ways.  These doctrines have distinct rationales and 
purposes.  However, the two doctrines should coexist in harmony.  
This harmony will be achieved by utilizing both doctrines to 
police power imbalances between parties and by allowing both 
doctrines to serve distributive justice goals.  Thus, distributive 
justice considerations should not be left to the doctrine of 
unconscionability alone.  Rather, both promissory estoppel and 
unconscionability should be used by the court to police the 
formation of contracts and to view this process through the eyes 
of distributive justice theory. 
B. From an Ignored Element to an Independent Element 
In contrast to the way justice is currently used, it is time for 
the courts to stop ignoring the justice element of promissory 
estoppel.  Disregarding this element is not only contrary to the 
wording of section 90,77 it also goes against the doctrine’s 
equitable nature and goals.78  Rather, courts should examine the 
justice element as a separate element and not make do with only 
referring to the promise and reliance elements of promissory 
estoppel.79  The justice requirement is an independent element of 
this doctrine, supplementing the promise and the reliance 
 
75 Id. § 208; U.C.C. § 2-302 (2012); see also Charles L. Knapp, Unconscionability 
in American Contract Law: A Twenty-First Century Survey, in COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACT LAW: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES 309 (Larry A. DiMatteo, Qi Zhou, 
Séverine Saintier & Keith Rowley eds., 2013). 
76 See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New 
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 489–90 (1967). 
77 Disregarding the justice element is also contrary to the view of Professor 
Williston, the drafter of the Restatement. Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: 
Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 484 (1950). 
78 See id. 
79 Id. at 483–84 (supporting the view that justice is a separate element of 
promissory estoppel and rejecting the view that justice is a guide to the application 
of the promise and reliance elements of the doctrine). 
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prongs.  This independent and new meaning of justice will be 
based on a theory of distributive justice that is further discussed 
below.  Thus, the justice element has a broader meaning than the 
loss or harm to the promisee due to her detrimental reliance and 
the unjust enrichment of the promisor. 
As mentioned, promissory estoppel has three main 
independent elements: the promise, the promisee’s reliance, and 
justice, which includes avoiding injustice.80  The justice element 
differs from the others in that it is a matter of law, while the 
other two elements constitute questions of fact.81  Accordingly, 
the jury determines the questions of fact, while the court 
determines the questions of law and policy.  The first two 
elements should be weighed in inverse to the third element.  
That is, the more clear, definite, and unambiguous the promise, 
the less weight need be given to justice considerations.  Similarly, 
the more the reliance is detrimental to the promisee, the lighter 
the burden of justice.  And vice versa, if the two elements are 
weak, then the justice needs to be very meaningful.  If the 
promise is not concrete enough and the reliance caused little or 
no loss, then the promisee needs to show significant justice 
considerations in order to enforce the promise.  In other words, 
courts should delicately balance these three elements.  Even if 
the promise is a little unclear or the reliance is not highly 
detrimental, this is not the end of the court’s examination.  The 
court should not make do with concluding that the promise and 
reliance elements are weak.  Rather, the court should further 
examine the justice element and only after balancing the relative 
impact of all the doctrine’s prongs conclude whether all the 
elements were satisfied.  Similarly, even if the promise is very 
clear and the reliance is highly injurious, the court may not 
conclude that the injustice is inferred and thus is satisfied.  
Rather, the court should further examine the justice element 
independently and weigh it against the former two elements. 
For example, in Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Company,82 an employer 
promised to pay an employee a pension for life upon her 
retirement and did pay her the monthly pension for five years.83  
 
80 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
81 See, e.g., R.S. Bennett & Co. v. Econ. Mech. Indus., Inc., 606 F.2d 182, 186 
(7th Cir. 1979); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 683, 698 (Wis. 1965). 
82 Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). 
83 Id. at 164–65. 
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Subsequently, however, the employer stopped paying and denied 
any contractual obligation toward the former employee, claiming 
that the payments were gratuitous.84  The employer’s promise for 
pension was clear, definite, and unambiguous.85  It was a formal 
resolution of the board of directors, which was communicated to 
the employee by telephone on the day of the board meeting.86  
Likewise, the employee showed detrimental reliance on the 
promise.87  She testified that she retired in reliance on the 
promised pension.88  As the court stated: 
At the time she retired plaintiff was 57 years of age.  At the 
time the payments were discontinued she was over 63 years of 
age.  It is a matter of common knowledge that it is virtually 
impossible for a woman of that age to find satisfactory 
employment, much less a position comparable to that which 
plaintiff enjoyed at the time of her retirement.89 
In addition, the employee received the pension for several 
years and did not seek another employment soon after her 
retirement, making her reliance on these payments even more 
detrimental.90  Because of the definite and formal promise and 
the financial loss caused by the reliance, the justice element need 
not be particularly weighty.  The court states, for example, that it 
does not matter whether the employee was unemployable due to 
an illness, her age, or whether the employee became 
unemployable before or after the pension payments were 
discontinued.91  There are situations in which the denial of the 
pension would seem harsher and more unconscionable, and thus 
the justice element would be given more weight.  However, in 
this case, due to the solid promise and reliance, the burden of the 
justice element is lighter and the financial loss will do to satisfy 
the justice element. 
 
 
 
84 Id. at 165, 167. 
85 Id. at 164–65. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 166. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 169. 
90 Id. at 166, 169. 
91 Id. at 168–69. 
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Another example is Grouse v. Group Health Plan, Inc.92  An 
employer made a job offer to Grouse.93  As a result, Grouse 
resigned from his job and declined another job offer.94  When he 
was ready to start working, after giving his former employer two 
weeks’ notice, he was told that someone else had been hired.95  In 
this case, the promise, a job offer, was made via telephone to 
Grouse and was not as definite as the promise made in 
Feinberg.96  Similarly, the financial loss due to the reliance was 
less acute in Grouse as compared to Feinberg.97  Though Grouse 
had difficulties securing other full-time employment, his wage 
loss was not as severe as Feinberg’s pension loss.98  Accordingly, 
the injustice element needs to satisfy higher standards in Grouse.  
As the court asserts, the employer’s behavior was such that 
“[u]nder these circumstances it would be unjust not to hold 
Group Health to its promise.”99  The court wished to discourage 
such behavior by employers and thus enforced the promise even 
though the loss to the employee and the promise were weak.100  
Taking into account the power imbalance between the parties, 
the justice element weighs in favor of compensating the 
promisee.101  Thus, rather than dismissing promissory estoppel 
claims because a promise was not clear and definite enough,102 
courts should weigh all three factors of the doctrine. 
Dickens v. Equifax Services, Inc.,103 discussed in the 
Introduction, provides another example in the context of 
employment relations.  The court concluded that the supervisor’s 
assurances did not constitute a clear promise and that the 
employee’s reliance on these assurances was unreasonable.104  
 
92 Grouse v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). 
93 Id. at 115. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 116. 
96 At the interview, only company policies, procedures, salaries, and benefits 
were discussed and not a concrete job offer. Id. at 115. 
97 Grouse, 306 N.W.2d at 116; Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163, 164 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1959). 
98 Grouse rejected a job offer based on the offer he received, so apparently he 
could have secured another job. Grouse, 306 N.W.2d. at 115. 
99 Id. at 116. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See, e.g., Martens v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 746 (Minn. 
2000); Ruud v. Great Plains Supply, Inc., 526 N.W.2d 369, 372 (Minn. 1995). 
103 No. 95-1217, 1996 WL 192973 (10th Cir. Apr. 22, 1996). 
104 Id. at *6. 
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One can disagree with this analysis and conclude that the 
employee’s reliance was not only reasonable but also detrimental 
and caused him, and his wife, substantial loss.  And one can 
conclude contrary to the court that the supervisor’s assurances 
constitute a clear and definite promise.  But even if one accepts 
that the promise and reliance elements were weak, the court 
should not have ignored the justice element.  Under the latter 
prong, the court should consider the long-term relations between 
the parties, the power imbalance between the employer and 
employee, the allocative effects of the contract, and public policy 
considerations in the context of employment relations.  These 
considerations not only counterbalance the weakness of the first 
two prongs, they also weigh heavily in favor of enforcing the 
promise. 
Two insurance cases provide other examples for the relation 
between the three elements of promissory estoppel.  The first 
case is Marker v. Preferred Fire Insurance Co.105  Marker 
purchased real property, and during the negotiations he agreed 
to retain the seller’s insurance policy on the property until the 
policy expired.106  Marker informed the insurance company 
representative that he was not interested in renewing the 
insurance policy, and he would have his father write a new 
policy.107  Marker asked the representative to notify him of the 
policy’s expiration date, and the representative replied, “I’ll do 
that.”108  A tornado hit the property after the insurance policy 
had expired.109  Marker sued the insurance company, relying on 
promissory estoppel as the basis of contractual obligation and 
claiming he relied on the promise to let him know when the 
insurance policy expired to his detriment.110  In Marker, the court 
rejected the promissory estoppel claim stating: 
In the first place there is no evidence whatsoever of any 
affirmative inducement or misrepresentation made by Johnson 
to Marker.  The circumstances which brought about any 
promise of notification from Johnson arose from a rather casual 
request by Marker that Johnson should let Marker know the 
expiration date of the policy so that Marker could have it 
 
105 506 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1973). 
106 Id. at 1166. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 1170 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
109 Id. at 1167. 
110 Id. at 1168. 
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renewed.  To this request Johnson allegedly responded, ‘I’ll do 
that.’  The evidence falls far short of showing that Johnson 
intended or expected Marker to rely upon the promise or that 
Marker reasonably had the right to rely upon Johnson’s 
promise.  Furthermore a refusal to enforce the doctrine in this 
case would in no way sanction the perpetuation of a fraud or 
result in other injustice.  It is also clear from the evidence that 
from the time the real estate contract was signed, plaintiff 
Marker had the original policy in his possession which clearly 
disclosed the expiration date.  Furthermore another copy of the 
policy was mailed to Marker by Johnson after November 5, 
1965, when Johnson executed the endorsement to the policy 
which added the names of Mr. and Mrs. Marker as additional 
named insureds.  Johnson could reasonably have assumed that 
he was carrying out his promise to notify Marker of the 
expiration date of the policy when he mailed a copy of the policy 
to Marker.  Also we again wish to stress the fact that Marker 
was an attorney and was himself a licensed agent for Preferred 
Fire Insurance Company.  The promise of Johnson to advise 
Marker of the expiration date of the policy was a promise wholly 
without consideration and essentially was made as a mere 
accommodation to Marker.  The terms of the policy were always 
within the knowledge of the plaintiff and if he failed to 
remember that the policy expired at a certain time before the 
tornado, it was his own negligence and not that of Johnson 
which prevented plaintiff from renewing his policy.111 
The second insurance case is Prudential Insurance Co. of 
America v. Clark.112  Clark, a marine, purchased a life insurance 
policy with no war risk or aviation exclusion clauses after 
enlisting.113  An agent of another insurance company persuaded 
him to drop his insurance by promising him an equivalent 
insurance policy.114  Based on this promise, Clark dropped his 
insurance policy and bought the new policy.115  That policy, 
however, did include a war risk or aviation exclusion clause.116  
After Clark was killed in Vietnam, the insurance company paid 
the beneficiaries but later sued them to return the money, 
 
111 Id. at 1170. 
112 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972). 
113 Id. at 934. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
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claiming it paid the claim through oversight and mistake.117  The 
court rejected the insurance company’s suit based on promissory 
estoppel.118 
The promise of the insurance agent in Clark was affirmative 
as compared to the mere “I’ll do that” assurance in Marker.  Also, 
Marker’s reliance was unreasonable for two reasons.  He was a 
licensed insurance agent, and he had the insurance policy in his 
hands, making him aware of the expiration date.119  In contrast to 
Marker, Clark dropped his insurance policy based on the agent’s 
promise.120  These differences between the two cases explain their 
different results.  Clark’s beneficiaries proved both the concrete 
promise and detrimental reliance elements of promissory 
estoppel.121  Thus, the justice element carried little weight, and 
the court accepted their promissory estoppel claim.  In contrast, 
Marker proved only a weak promise and unreasonable reliance 
on his part.122  Therefore, he needed to show very strong justice 
considerations in order to enforce the promise.  He failed to do so, 
and the court rejected his promissory estoppel claim.123  Juliet 
Kostritsky argues that while in Clark there was a difference of 
status between the professional agent and the layman insured, in 
Marker no such power imbalance between the parties exited.124  
She concludes that the power imbalance is the reason for the 
different outcome in these two cases.125  The above analysis of 
Clark and Marker adds to Kostritsky’s explanation.  It is not only 
the status disparity between the parties, but also the justice 
element in conjunction with the other elements of the promissory 
estoppel doctrine that distinguish between the cases.126 
Another example is the famous Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 
Inc. case.127  An agent for Red Owl represented on numerous 
occasions to the Hoffmans that Red Owl would build a store 
building for the Hoffmans to operate in return for their 
 
117 Id. at 935. 
118 Id. at 936. 
119 Marker v. Preferred Fire Ins. Co., 506 P.2d 1163, 1171 (Kan. 1973). 
120 Clark, 456 F.2d at 936. 
121 Id. at 936. 
122 Marker, 506 P.2d at 1170–71. 
123 Id. at 1170. 
124 Kostritsky, supra note 72, at 918. 
125 Id. 
126 Another difference between the two cases is that while Clark involves loss of 
life, Marker involves loss of property. 
127 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965). 
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investment of $18,000.128  In reliance upon these representations, 
the Hoffmans sold their bakery building and business and their 
grocery store and business, they purchased a building site to 
operate the store, and they rented a residence for themselves.129  
The Hoffmans followed Red Owl’s requests in order for the deal 
to go through; however, the negotiations between the parties 
were terminated, and Red Owl did not make good on its 
representations.130 
The court acknowledged that the promise was mainly oral 
assurances that were not highly definite.131  Nevertheless, the 
court held that under promissory estoppel the promise need not 
be as definite as a promise supported by consideration,132 and it 
accepted the Hoffmans’ promissory estoppel claim.  It is possible 
to explain that this is due to the detrimental reliance by the 
Hoffmans;133 however, even though the court did not mention the 
justice element, it came to the right decision in the context of a 
justice analysis as well.  The ill treatment of the Hoffmans and 
the relations of trust between Red Owl’s representatives and the 
Hoffmans lead to such a conclusion.134  Although the promise 
element is weak, the justice element tipped the scales in favor of 
the Hoffmans.  Taking into account the franchise relations as 
part of the justice analysis counterbalances the weakness of the 
other elements.  While the court disregarded the justice element 
in its opinion, the above analysis may explain why the court 
accepted the promissory estoppel claim in spite of the indefinite 
promise. 
In some of the cases discussed here, the conclusion under the 
justice analysis resembles the conclusion of the court.  However, 
a meaningful justice element would make a substantive change 
in the promissory estoppel doctrine.  In some cases, the justice 
analysis will result in a different conclusion, and in others the 
analysis will give meaningful support for the conclusion.  Indeed, 
in some cases, even though the court did not explicitly consider 
the justice element, it seems that the court was guided by a sense 
 
128 Id. at 274. 
129 Id. at 268–69. 
130 Id. at 274–75. 
131 Id. at 274. 
132 Id. 
133 William C. Whitford & Stewart Macaulay, Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores: The 
Rest of the Story, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 801, 855 (2010). 
134 Hoffman, 133 N.W.2d at 275. 
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of justice in reaching its decision.  This Article suggests that 
courts affirmatively and explicitly consider justice as an 
independent element rather than be guided by a vague sense of 
justice.  Furthermore, in order to better understand the 
formation process, courts should take into account the relations 
between the parties and the power dynamics, the allocative 
implications, and other policy considerations.  This will make the 
court’s analysis more contextualized and lead to just conclusions. 
Taking the power imbalance between the parties and their 
relations into account along with other public policy and 
distribution considerations under the justice element does not 
mean a presumption in favor of accepting the promissory 
estoppel claim of the underprivileged party.  Under such a 
presumption, the justice element overshadows the other 
elements.  However, the courts should consider all of the 
doctrines’ elements and should give more weight to the justice 
element than they currently do. 
C. From Corrective Justice to Distributive Justice 
There is a debate among legal scholars whether private 
law,135 in general, and contract law, in particular, should promote 
distributive justice considerations.136  Much of the literature 
 
135 The debate as to whether tort law should promote distributive justice is 
similar to the debate in contract law. Supporting the view that private law should 
promote distributive justice, see, for example, Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Corrective 
Justice, Substantive Equality and Tort Law, in TORT THEORY 48, 48 (Ken Cooper-
Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Economic 
Analysis, Substantive Equality and Tort Law, in TORT THEORY 131, 131 (Ken 
Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson eds., 1993); Ted Decoste, Taking Torts 
Progressively, in TORT THEORY 240, 241 (Ken Cooper-Stephenson & Elaine Gibson 
eds., 1993); TSACHI KEREN-PAZ, TORTS, EGALITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
51 (2007); Peter Cane, Distributive Justice and Tort Law, 2001 N.Z. L. REV. 401, 404 
(2001); Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of 
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194–95 (2000); Tsachi Keren-Paz, An Inquiry into 
the Merits of Redistribution Through Tort Law: Rejecting the Claim of Randomness, 
16 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 91, 91 (2003); see also Dan Priel, Private Law: Commutative or 
Distributive?, 77 MOD. L. REV. 308 (2014). But see, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, 
CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 263–64 (2012); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 
210–14 (1995); Alan Schwartz, Products Liability and Judicial Wealth 
Redistributions, 51 IND. L.J. 558, 587–89 (1976). 
136 Some scholars support the view that contract law should promote 
distributive justice. See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 285–86 
(1999); Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Injustice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 
147 (2008); Hanoch Dagan, The Distributive Foundation of Corrective Justice, 98 
MICH. L. REV. 138, 139–40 (1999); Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and 
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advocating application of distributive justice under contract law 
negates the arguments raised against such application.137  Many 
scholars who support achieving distributive goals through 
contract law do not develop arguments for doing so.  Rather, they 
challenge the contrary view according to which distributive 
justice should not be considered under contract law.138  This 
Article takes a different approach.  The author’s previous article 
demonstrated how promissory estoppel has a disparate impact on 
different social groups.139  Specifically, underprivileged promisees 
use promissory estoppel to enforce the promises made to them.  
 
Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 624–27 (1943); Christine Jolls, Behavioral 
Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1656–57 
(1998); Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motive in Contract and Tort 
Law, with Special References to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 
41 MD. L. REV. 563, 563 (1982); Josse G. Klijnsma, Contract Law as Fairness, 28 
RATIO JURIS 68 (2015); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and 
Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 598, 600 (2005); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. 
Tabachnick, Taxation, the Private Law, and Distributive Justice, 23 SOC. PHIL. & 
POL’Y 142, 142 (2006); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 
89 YALE L.J. 472, 474 (1980); Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of 
Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 MINN. L. REV. 326, 397 (2006); Eric A. 
Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability 
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom To Contract, 24 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 283, 285 (1995); Arthur Ripstein, Private Order and Public Justice: 
Kant and Rawls, 92 VA. L. REV. 1391, 1395 (2006); Chris William Sanchirico, 
Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1008–14 
(2001). Other scholars contend that contract law is unsuitable to promote 
distributive justice or that other areas of law, such as tax law, are more efficient and 
suitable to that end. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 105–07 (1981); 
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 100–01 (1993); 
Horst Eidenmuller, Party Autonomy, Distributive Justice and the Conclusion of 
Contracts in the DCFR, 5 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 109, 119–20 (2009) (“[I]t would have 
been better for the DCFR to not even try to achieve distributive purposes by the 
means of private law. On the one hand, redistribution by private law is always less 
efficient than redistribution by social and tax law, while on the other hand it is 
virtually impossible to attain when it comes to contract law.”); Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in 
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994); W.N.R. Lucy, Contract as 
a Mechanism of Distributive Justice, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 132, 147 (1989); 
William K.S. Wang, Reflections on Contract Law and Distributive Justice: A Reply to 
Kronman, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 513, 513–14 (1982). But see Liam B. Murphy, The 
Practice of Promise and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT 
LAW 151 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince Saprai eds., 2014). 
137 See, e.g., Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 193 (Gregory Klass, George Letsas & Prince 
Saprai eds., 2014); Kronman, supra note 136; Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 136, at 
396; Posner, supra note 136. 
138 Bagchi, supra note 137. 
139 Gan, supra note 3, at 56. 
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Based on this groups-based analysis, this Article further argues 
that distributive justice considerations are warranted under the 
analysis of the promissory estoppel doctrine.  Rather than 
concentrating on why the application of distributive justice in 
contract law is not inappropriate, this Article establishes that the 
justice element of promissory estoppel should be used as a tool 
for applying distributive justice based on the previous article’s 
groups-based analysis of the contract formation process. 
This Article supports the view that contract law should serve 
the goals of distributive justice and not only those of corrective 
justice.140  Corrective justice is narrowly concerned with 
balancing between the interests of the parties to the contract or 
remedying wrongful losses that one party inflicted on the 
other.141  Unlike corrective justice, distributive justice takes a 
broader view and is concerned with the allocation of wealth, 
resources, or entitlements among members of society.142  These 
distributive justice goals should be achieved by general contract 
law, not only by tax law and regulation in specific areas of law 
such as housing and employment.  Furthermore, justice means 
more than the damage caused to the promisee by her detrimental 
reliance on the promise.  Rather, justice should include public 
policy considerations beyond correcting the imbalance between 
the parties.  The impact of the promise, the harm caused to the 
promisee by the reliance, and the benefit to the promisor are only 
some of the relevant considerations.  The court should weigh 
unjust enrichment and the promisee’s loss alongside other factors 
such as power imbalance between the parties, their relations, 
and distributive justice considerations.143  Another consideration 
 
140 For distributive justice in contract law see, for example, Bruce Ackerman, 
Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing 
Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093, 1097 (1971); James 
Gordley, Morality and Contract: The Question of Paternalism, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1733, 1737 (2007); Richard S. Markovits, The Distributive Impact, Allocative 
Efficiency, and Overall Desirability of Ideal Housing Codes: Some Theoretical 
Clarifications, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1815, 1817 (1976); Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and 
Justice: The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 
70 IOWA L. REV. 769, 780 (1985); see also Helge Dedek, Duties of Love and Self-
Perfection: Moses Mendelssohn’s Theory of Contract, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 713, 
716 (2013) (Mendelssohn’s theory of contract is “entirely rooted in altruism and 
distributive justice.” (emphasis removed)). 
141 Zamir, supra note 38, at 108. 
142 Markovits, supra note 140, at 1817. 
143 These considerations should be taken into account not only under the 
distributive justice analysis but also under relational theory of contract. See, e.g., 
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is to provide a viable avenue for enforcing promises when the 
formal requirements of consideration are lacking due to a power 
imbalance between the parties.  This broad interpretation of 
justice is not limited to corrective justice but includes social 
aspects of the contract as well.  By looking beyond the parties, 
contract law gives justice a deeper meaning.  The formation of 
contract should be addressed not only from the point of view of 
the promisor and the promisee, but from a larger social aspect.144 
Promissory estoppel is mainly used by certain groups of 
promisees—such as employees, family members, general 
contractors, insurees, and franchisees—against the more 
privileged promisors.145  As promissory estoppel suits are brought 
mainly by underprivileged groups’ members, courts should 
address these promisees’ needs and the distributive results of 
their claims.  Thus, in examining the justice element, courts 
should take into account power imbalances and the relations 
between the parties, members of different groups.  Since 
promissory estoppel disparately impacts different social groups, 
it should address the distributive effects of the formation process.  
Promissory estoppel should be sensitive to the allocative 
implications of the contracting process and how formation of 
contract has different implications for different social groups.146  
This factor will enable the courts to better understand the 
contracting process and to empower underprivileged promisees.  
 
Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. 
REV. 483, 484 (1985). 
144 For a theory of relational justice that goes beyond distributive justice, see 
Hanoch Dagan & Avihay Dorfman, Just Relationships (Tel Aviv Univ., Working 
Paper, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2463537. 
145 Gan, supra note 3, at 80–81. 
146 For a different view on justice under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, see 
Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and 
Torts, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 695, 759–60 (2001) (“The traditional rules of restitution and 
promissory estoppel work when the facts fit, that is, when there is a clear unjust 
enrichment or a clear promise clearly relied upon. The problem is how to decide if an 
obligation exists when there is not a negotiated and well-drafted contract, nor an 
explicit promise that was foreseeably relied upon nor a clearly unjust act that 
enriched the defendant at the plaintiff’s expense. I think that the best we can hope 
for is some amount of rough justice. That a claim doesn’t fit the rules of promissory 
estoppel or the rules of restitution should not end the matter, though it may make us 
ask that the plaintiff show us something else. I would start by looking at the 
relationship between the parties. Of course everything is a relationship; the word is 
not magic. Relationships can be good or bad—or some of both. They can be very 
formal. They can be paternalistic. They can be exploitative. And they can be 
indifferent, a relationship where there is no relationship.”). 
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Not taking this factor into account has distributional effects:  It 
maintains the status quo and sustains the current allocation.  As 
is demonstrated in the examples that follow, there are different 
kinds of power imbalance and relations dynamics.  There are 
differences between employer-employee, franchisor-franchisee, 
insurance company-insuree, general contractor-subcontractors, 
and husband-wife relationships to name just a few examples.  
Thus, the court should engage in a nuanced analysis of the 
relationship between the parties. 
Many promissory estoppel cases are brought in the 
employment context and provide good examples of typical 
promissory estoppel cases described above.  These cases deal 
with two social groups and the power imbalance between them.  
Both denied pension cases and denied job offer cases demonstrate 
the power dynamics between employers and employees in 
negotiations.  The former misuse their powerful position to make 
a promise and then deny that promise after benefiting from it.  
When the promisees cannot enforce the promise based on breach 
of contract, promissory estoppel is their only claim for enforcing 
the broken promise.  Looking not only at the parties but beyond 
them to the employer-employee relations, then, promissory 
estoppel is an important tool to empower employees.  This 
redistributive goal is to enforce the promises made to 
employees.147 
Feinberg,148 a denied pension case, and Grouse,149 a denied 
job offer case, discussed earlier, provide two examples.  In the 
former, the court should have considered the long-term work 
relations between the parties150 and the way employers treat 
elderly people as they retire from work.  In the latter, the court 
should have considered the ill treatment of employment 
candidates.151  In such cases, the court should examine whether 
 
147 Hillman, supra note 15, at 27. For justice in the employment context, see also 
Larry A. DiMatteo et al., Justice, Employment, and the Psychological Contract, 90 
OR. L. REV. 449, 484–85, 509–10 (2011); Martin H. Malin, The Distributive and 
Corrective Justice Concerns in the Debate over Employment At-Will: Some 
Preliminary Thoughts, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 117, 119–21 (1992). 
148 Feinberg v. Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959). For a similar 
case, see also Katz v. Danny Dare, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). 
149 Grouse v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981). 
150 Feinberg worked in the company from 1910 to 1949. Feinberg, 322 S.W.2d at 
164–66. She received the pension until 1956. Id. at 166. 
151 Grouse was made a job offer not in accordance with company’s policy that 
required a written recommendation which Grouse did not provide. The interviewer 
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employers misuse their power advantage over the employees, and 
prospective or former employees.  They should also disallow 
employers to make promises to employees and then deny the 
promises to the detriment of the employee.  Dickens,152 discussed 
in the Introduction, provides another example.  In that case, the 
relations between the employer and employee and the power 
imbalance were relevant considerations under the justice 
element.  The court should have considered whether to allow an 
employer to misuse his power over the employee, offer the 
employee relocation and encourage the employee to radically 
change his position, and then deny such an offer after benefiting 
from the employee’s move.  Unfortunately, the court ignored the 
justice element. 
In another employment case, the court declared: 
In the present case, to the extent that Suehisa’s statements 
could be construed as promising Gonsalves that he would retain 
his job regardless of the findings of the investigation, we hold 
that they are unenforceable as a matter of public policy.  An 
interpretation by Gonsalves that would ensure his continued 
employment, despite findings that he sexually harassed others 
in his workplace, would be to either absolve Nissan of its 
obligations to take immediate and appropriate action to prevent 
sexual harassment or to hinder Nissan in its fulfillment of its 
obligations.  To enforce Suehisa’s “promises” after a finding of 
sexual harassment would be offensive to public policy.  Thus, we 
hold that, in the present case, to the extent that promises were 
made to Gonsalves that he would retain his job regardless of the 
outcome of the investigation, those promises were 
unenforceable, and Gonsalves is unable to maintain a claim for 
promissory estoppel as a matter of public policy.153 
The court’s decision is based on public policy considerations 
outside the promissory estoppel doctrine.  What the court should 
have done was consider under the justice element of promissory 
estoppel the consequences of enforcing such a promise to an 
employee.  Promising an employee that he can keep his job in 
 
called Grouse to make sure he quit his position but did not call him to let him know 
that the position was filled by someone else. Only when Grouse called to report that 
he was free to begin working was he told that someone else was hired. When Grouse 
complained, he got an apology, but no further actions were taken. Grouse, 306 
N.W.2d at 116. 
152 Dickens v. Equifax Servs., Inc., No. 951217, 1996 WL 192973 (10th Cir. Apr. 
22, 1996). 
153 Gonsalves v. Nissan Motor Corp., 58 P.3d 1196, 1213 (Haw. 2002). 
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spite of a complaint of sexual harassment is unjust.  It will have 
a damaging effect on work relations and will work against the 
goal of eradicating sexual harassment in the workplace.  Looking 
at employer-employee relations and work relations at large, with 
an emphasis on a problem of sexual harassment in the 
employment context, is part of justice considerations.  These 
considerations reach beyond the specific parties in this case.  
Sexual harassment is a result of power relations in the 
employment setting.154  Under the justice element of promissory 
estoppel, the court should include examination of  
employer-employee relations dynamics. 
Another employment case involves the relations between a 
union and management.155  The employees argued that they 
made wage and benefit concessions in order to modernize the 
plant and keep it open.156  After the plant was closed, the 
employees sued the employer.157  The court rejected their 
promissory estoppel claim because the employer’s officials’ oral 
statements did not constitute a promise.158  However, the court 
disregarded the justice element.  The court should have policed 
the way the company conducted its business at the expense of the 
employees and work relations at large.159  The court viewed the 
corporation as an owner that had discretion to close the plant.160  
The court did not consider the context of the long-term relations 
between the employees and employer, and the financial behavior 
of the corporation to the detriment of its employees.  This larger 
picture should inform the court to better understand the facts.  
Taking into account this background complicates the owner’s 
discretionary rationale to the court. 
A similar example involves a case dealing with the relations 
between farmers and the banks that loan them money.161  In 
State Bank of Standish v. Curry,162 the Currys, dairy farmers, 
 
154 CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A 
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1 (1979). 
155 Abbington v. Dayton Malleable, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 1290, 1292–95 (S.D. Ohio 
1983). 
156 Id. at 1296. 
157 Id. at 1295. 
158 Id. at 1297. 
159 AMY KASTELY ET AL., CONTRACTING LAW 312–16 (4th ed. 2006). 
160 Id. 
161 See generally State Bank of Standish v. Curry, 500 N.W.2d 104 (Mich. 1993). 
162 500 N.W.2d 104. 
FINAL_GAN 10/16/2015 2:49 PM 
90 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:55   
argued that the bank promised to make them a loan, on which 
they relied, and the bank argued that assurances were not made 
in the context of a specific loan.163  When the bank denied the 
loan, the farmers sued, and the court accepted the farmers’ 
promissory estoppel claim.164  The court based its decision on the 
promise made by the bank165 and on the Currys’ reliance on that 
promise166 and disregarded the justice element.167  The court did 
not consider generally the long-term relations between the 
farmers and the bank,168 the trust between the parties, the power 
dynamics between the parties, and the dependency of the 
farmers on the banks.169  The Currys’ loan is set in the 
background of power dynamics between the bank and its 
customers and the farming industry’s economics.170  This context 
should be addressed under the justice element to enable the court 
to better understand the situation and to consider the 
distributive implications of its decision on the larger society, 
here, the farming industry.171 
 
163 Id. at 106–07. 
164 Id. at 111. 
165 Id. The bank officer stated that since “the Currys were doing a good 
job[,] . . . the bank would support them.” Id. at 106. The Currys received loans from 
the bank for many years. Id. 
166 Based on the bank’s promise to make the loan, the Currys did not submit a 
bid in the government’s dairy buy-out program. Id. 
167 Id. at 113 n.4  (Riley, J., dissenting) (“The essential justification for the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel is the avoidance of substantial hardship or injustice 
were the promise not to be enforced. Too liberal an application of the concept will 
result in an unwitting and unintended undermining of the traditional rule requiring 
consideration for a contract. This is particularly true where the promise is the loan 
of money. Such promises, even when unsupported by consideration, do induce 
borrowers to neglect to secure the needed money elsewhere, and lenders must be 
held to anticipate such conduct. To hold as enforceable, however, a voluntary 
promise of a loan made to one who, in reliance thereon, fails to exercise a valueless 
right to seek the money elsewhere, would be tantamount to rendering all such 
voluntary promises of a loan enforceable without consideration. A determination 
declaring such a deviation from presently accepted contract principles should only 
come from a confrontation with that issue, and not as an unintended consequence of 
the loose application of promissory estoppel to promises to lend money.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
168 The Currys obtained yearly loans from the bank since 1975 and until 1986, 
when they were refused the loan, the subject of this case. Id. at 105. 
169 KASTELY, supra note 159, at 290. 
170 See generally State Bank of Standish, 500 N.W.2d 104. 
171 For other similar promissory estoppel cases involving relations between 
creditor and debtor see, for example, Aceves v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
507 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Garcia v. World Sav., FSB, 107 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2010); see also Amy B. Parker, Mending Broken Promises: Allowing 
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Another interesting case, Ypsilanti v. General Motors 
Corp.,172 concerns a situation in which a corporation decided to 
close a plant after it received tax abatement from the town.173  
The question was whether a promise was made by the 
corporation to keep the plant’s production and keep creating jobs 
for the town’s employees on which the town reasonably relied and 
gave the corporation the tax abatement.174  In one case, the trial 
court accepted the town’s promissory estoppel claim and held 
that the corporation is bound by its promise and is enjoined from 
transferring the production from the plant to another facility.175  
On appeal, however, the court reversed and rejected the 
promissory estoppel claim.176  While the trial court found a clear 
promise on which the town reasonably relied, the court of appeals 
held that these elements were not satisfied.177  However, 
interestingly, while the court of appeals disregarded the justice 
element of promissory estoppel and only addressed General 
Motors’ promise and the people of Ypsilanti’s reasonable reliance 
on that promise, the trial court gave the justice element 
considerable weight.178  The trial court held: 
This Court . . . simply finds that the failure to act in this case 
would result in a terrible injustice and that the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel should be applied.  Each judge who dons 
this robe assumes the awesome, and lonely, responsibility to 
make decisions about justice, and injustice, which will 
dramatically affect the way people are forced to live their lives.  
Every such decision must be the judge’s own and it must be 
made honestly and in good conscience.  There would be a gross 
inequity and patent unfairness if General Motors, having lulled 
the people of the Ypsilanti area into giving up millions of tax 
dollars which they so desperately need to educate their children 
and provide basic governmental services, is allowed to simply 
 
Homeowners To Pursue Claims of Promissory Estoppel Against Lenders When 
Denied Loan Modifications, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 985 (2013). 
172 No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 132385, at *1 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Feb. 9, 1993), rev’d, 
506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
173 See, e.g., id.; Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 
556, 557–58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
174 Ypsilanti, 506 N.W.2d at 558. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 562. The Michigan Supreme Court refused to hear the case. Charter 
Twp. of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp., 509 N.W.2d 152 (Mich. 1993). 
177 Id. at 559. 
178 Ypsilanti, 1993 WL 132385, at *13. 
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decide that it will desert 4500 workers and their families 
because it thinks it can make these same cars a little cheaper 
somewhere else.  Perhaps another judge in another court would 
not feel moved by that injustice and would labor to find a legal 
rationalization to allow such conduct.  But in this Court it is my 
responsibility to make that decision.  My conscience will not 
allow this injustice to happen.179 
Contrary to the court of appeals, the trial court gave the 
justice element a broad meaning.180  It considered the long-term 
relations between the parties181 and the financial consequences to 
the town if the plant were closed.182  It looked beyond the parties 
to the larger economic and social context.183  This difference in 
the two courts’ approaches to the justice element of promissory 
estoppel also explains the different results they reached.  
Unfortunately, unlike the trial court, the court of appeals did not 
use justice as a guide in making its decision.184 
Clark185 and Marker,186 discussed above, provide other 
examples.  Both cases involve relations between an insurance 
company and an insured.187  As Kostritsky argues, the power 
dynamics between the parties are relevant factors in the courts’ 
 
179 Id. at *13. 
180 See id. 
181 General Motors operated the two plants in Ypsilanti from 1975 through 1990 
and received eleven tax abatements of over 1.3 billion dollars. Id. at *4. 
182 Consideration of the relation between the town of Ypsilanti and General 
Motors is apparent also in the trial court’s analysis of the promise—the many 
meetings between General Motors’ representatives and the town’s officials—and 
reliance—the many years of tax abatements worth millions of dollars. 
183 For an analysis of this case taking into account this special context, see 
Adam Michael Lett, Note, Tax Abatements and Promissory Estoppel: A Match Not 
Made in Ypsilanti, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1301 (1995); Joshua P. Rubin, Note, Take the 
Money and Stay: Industrial Location Incentives and Relational Contracting, 70 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1277 (1995); David L. Gregory, Company Closings and Community 
Consequences, 72 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (1994); see also DON MONTIE, MORE OF 
BEEN THERE (2012). 
184 For a different opinion, see Halle Fine Terrion, Comment, Charter Township 
of Ypsilanti v. General Motors: The Politics of Promissory Estoppel Run Amok, 43 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1475 (1993). For other similar promissory estoppel cases 
involving relations between the plant and the corporation, see, for example, Local 
1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980); see 
also Harris Freeman, The First of Thousands? The Long View of Local 1330’s 
Challenge to Management Rights and Plant Closings, 7 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL 
LEFT 55 (2011). 
185 Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Clark, 456 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1972). 
186 Marker v. Preferred Fire Ins. Co., 506 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1973). 
187 For another similar promissory estoppel case involving insurance, see, for 
example, Green v. Helmcamp Ins. Agency, 499 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
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analyses though the courts did not consider explicitly the justice 
element of promissory estoppel.188  The relations between the 
parties and the imbalance of power between them is part of the 
justice element and is a consideration for or against enforcing the 
promise. 
Another example involves franchisee-franchisor relations.  In 
Red Owl, the classic promissory estoppel case discussed above, 
the court disregarded the justice element.189  The court should 
have addressed the relational character of the contract.190  This 
context relates to the incompleteness and indefinite nature of the 
promise of the franchisor.191  But, more generally, this context 
also relates to the franchise relationship itself and its allocative 
aspects.  In such cases, the court should take into account this 
consideration rather than be guided by a vague sense of justice. 
One example of taking into account public policy 
considerations beyond the parties under the justice prong of 
promissory estoppel is the issue of a promise of confidentiality to 
news sources under the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  In such cases, the courts consider how enforcing 
the promise of anonymity will affect freedom of the press.  In the 
leading case, Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,192 the court concluded: 
 
188 Kostritsky, supra note 72, at 918. 
189 Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Wis. 1965) (“We 
conclude that injustice would result here if plaintiffs were not granted some relief 
because of the failure of defendants to keep their promises which induced plaintiffs 
to act to their detriment.”). 
190 Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of 
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927, 928 (1990). 
191 Id. at 979. 
192 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387 (Minn. 1992). For the history of 
this case, see Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990); Cohen v. 
Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989). For an analysis of this 
case, see, for example, Jerome A. Barron, Cohen v. Cowles Media and Its 
Significance for First Amendment Law and Journalism, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
419 (1994); Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 35 GA. L. 
REV. 1087 (2001); Kyu Ho Youm & Harry W. Stonecipher, The Legal Bounds of 
Confidentiality Promises: Promissory Estoppel and the First Amendment, 45 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 63 (1992); Joseph H. Kaufman, Comment, Beyond Cohen v Cowles Media 
Co.: Confidentiality Agreements and Efficiency Within the “Marketplace of Ideas”, 
1993 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 255 (1993); Daniel A. Levin & Ellen Blumberg Rubert, 
Promises of Confidentiality to News Sources After Cohen v. Cowles Media Company: 
A Survey of Newspaper Editors, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 423 (1994); Joseph W. 
Ragusa, Comment, Biting the Hand That Feeds You: The Reporter-Confidential 
Source Relationship in the Wake of Cohen v. Cowles Media Company, 67 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 125 (1993); Carl Werner, Note, Collision Without Injury: Three Years After 
Cohen, Contract Principles and Freedom of the Press Co-Exist Nicely, 30 HOUS. L. 
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The newspapers argue it is unjust to be penalized for publishing 
the whole truth, but it is not clear this would result in an 
injustice in this case.  For example, it would seem veiling 
Cohen’s identity by publishing the source as someone close to 
the opposing gubernatorial ticket would have sufficed as a 
sufficient reporting of the “whole truth.”  Cohen, on the other 
hand, argues that it would be unjust for the law to countenance, 
at least in this instance, the breaking of a promise.  We agree 
that denying Cohen any recourse would be unjust.  What is 
significant in this case is that the record shows the defendant 
newspapers themselves believed that they generally must keep 
promises of confidentiality given a news source.  The reporters 
who actually gave the promises adamantly testified that their 
promises should have been honored.  The editors who 
countermanded the promises conceded that never before or 
since have they reneged on a promise of confidentiality. . . . It 
was this long-standing journalistic tradition that Cohen, who 
has worked in journalism, relied upon in asking for and 
receiving a promise of anonymity.  Neither side in this case 
clearly holds the higher moral ground, but in view of the 
defendants’ concurrence in the importance of honoring promises 
of confidentiality, and absent the showing of any compelling 
need in this case to break that promise, we conclude that the 
resultant harm to Cohen requires a remedy here to avoid an 
injustice.  In short, defendants are liable in damages to plaintiff 
for their broken promise.193 
In these cases, the courts looked beyond the parties to the 
contract and took into account considerations of freedom of 
speech, the relations between the reporters and the source, the 
ability of the journalists to truthfully report the news, and the 
right of the public to receive the full information.194  These public 
policy considerations, and not merely correcting the equilibrium 
between the parties, were at the center of the cases.195  
Furthermore, these public policy considerations were addressed  
 
 
 
REV. 2085 (1994); Gregory F. Monday, Note, Cohen v. Cowles Media Is Not a 
Promising Decision, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1243 (1992). For more promissory estoppel 
cases enforcing promises by the media, see, for example, Ruzicka v. Conde Nast 
Publ’ns, 999 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1993). 
193 Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 391–92. 
194 See generally id. 
195 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668–72 (1991). 
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under the justice element of promissory estoppel, as opposed to 
yielding the result to public policy considerations outside the 
scope of the promissory estoppel doctrine.196 
Unconscionability doctrine serves distributive justice 
goals.197  Thus, policing the allocative aspects of the formation 
process using both promissory estoppel and unconscionability 
doctrine will harmonize contract law. 
There are different theories of distributive justice.198  In spite 
of these differences, choosing one theory of distributive justice to 
be applied under the promissory estoppel doctrine is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  As this doctrine is concerned with different 
social groups that interact with one another,199 there is a need to 
take this background into account, under any theory of 
distributive justice. 
D. The Remedy 
Courts should have broad discretion to award the remedy 
that justice requires.  The courts should have full range of 
contractual remedies to choose from to tailor to the specific case 
before them.  Most times, courts would probably award either 
expectation damages or reliance damages, but the remedies 
should not be so confined.  A court may award the promisee the 
value of the promised performance or the losses she suffered as a 
result of her change in position.  But in some cases, restitution, 
specific performance,200 or prejudgment interest,201 for example, 
might be a more adequate remedy.  In Ypsilanti, discussed above, 
specific performance, rather than damages, was the appropriate 
 
196 Cohen, 479 N.W.2d at 391–92. 
197 Bagchi, supra note 137, at 135. 
198 See, e.g., SAMUEL FLEISCHACKER, A SHORT HISTORY OF DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE (2004); JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1996).  
199 Gan, supra note 3, at 100. 
200 For cases involving promises to convey land where specific performance was 
awarded under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, see, for example, Mazer v. 
Jackson Ins. Agency, 340 So. 2d 770, 772–73 (Ala. 1976); Christy v. Hoke, 618 P.2d 
1095, 1096 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Elgin Nat’l Indus. v. Howard Indus., 264 So. 2d 
440, 441 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Johnson v. Pattison, 185 N.W.2d 790, 795, 797–
98 (Iowa 1971); Cellucci v. Sun Oil Co., 320 N.E.2d 919, 921, 926–27 (Mass. App. Ct. 
1974), aff’d, 331 N.E.2d 813 (Mass. 1975); Lear v. Bishop, 476 P.2d 18, 22 (Nev. 
1970); see also Skebba v. Kasch, 724 N.W.2d 408 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (awarding 
specific performance in the employment context). 
201 See, e.g., Remes v. Nordic Grp., 726 A.2d 77, 78 (Vt. 1999). 
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remedy.202  The equitable nature of promissory estoppel supports 
this discretion and flexibility in remedies.203  As opposed to the 
formal bargained-for rules, this doctrine should be more  
open-ended and award the appropriate remedy in each case. 
The result of the above analysis will be a harmonious 
promissory estoppel—opening the justice element to a broader 
set of considerations alongside wide discretion in awarding 
remedies.  Not only will the court take into account many 
different factors, such as how the parties are relatively situated 
as well as social factors and public policy, the court will also 
tailor the remedy to the specific situation.  Like the justice 
element of promissory estoppel, the remedy should also be 
applied broadly. 
E. Why Is Justice Important? 
Promissory estoppel is an important doctrine for 
subordinated social groups.  For example, Neil G. Williams has 
argued that parties who breach a promise to marry, usually men, 
should be liable for damages under promissory estoppel.204  These 
reliance damages would compensate the promisee, usually a 
woman, for the economic harm she suffered without the 
stereotypes associated with the breach of promise to marry 
suit.205  Gillian K. Hadfield provides another example.  She 
argues that promissory estoppel offers an alternative logic that 
would help solve the “dilemma of choice.”206  This dilemma is “the 
 
202 Indeed, the trial court that accepted the promissory estoppel claim ordered 
that GMC is enjoined from transferring the production from the plant to another 
facility. Charter Twp. of Ypsilanti v. Gen. Motors Corp, No. 92-43075-CK, 1993 WL 
132385, at *13–14. (Mich. Cir. Ct., Feb. 9, 1993), rev’d, 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1993). 
203 Holmes, supra note 32, at 516 (“The remedy for breach is discretionary and 
personalized, predicated on the principles and standards of good faith, conscience, 
honesty, and equity. A promisee or third party recovering under promissory estoppel 
should neither be penalized nor experience a windfall. Equitable promissory estoppel 
empowers courts to fashion a personalized remedy from the full range of remedies. 
Courts can award expectation, reliance, restitution, specific performance, exemplary, 
injunctive, or other appropriate relief to fit the crime and achieve corrective justice 
between the parties.”). 
204 Neil G. Williams, What To Do When There’s No “I Do”: A Model for Awarding 
Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1021–22 (1995). 
205 Id. at 1022–23. 
206 See Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist 
Dilemmas to a Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1235, 1249–50 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see Debora L. 
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conflict between promoting women’s autonomy and freedom of 
choice on the one hand, and protecting women from the harmful 
consequences of choices made under conditions of inequality on 
the other.”207  In other words, the tension is between freedom of 
contract on the one hand and paternalism on the other.208  This 
Article supports the view that promissory estoppel is an 
important doctrine for underprivileged social groups but by using 
a different approach and for different reasons. 
In a recent article, the author argues that promissory 
estoppel is an important doctrine because it strengthens the right 
of disadvantaged parties to contract.209  Many promissory 
estoppel cases are situations in which the promisees cannot prove 
a breach of contract claim because they fail to meet the 
formalities of the consideration doctrine.  Thus, promissory 
estoppel is their only way to enforce the promise made to them.  
Because of this function, promissory estoppel then raises issues 
of participation in benefitting from and access to contract.  In 
other words, it involves the issue of the inclusiveness of contract 
law.  This article is theoretical and argues for the importance of 
promissory estoppel due to this important role it plays.  More 
generally, it calls for a more inclusive contract law that is 
sensitive and open to the inclusion of disadvantaged social 
groups. 
Patricia J. Williams argues that rights discourse, both rights 
in general and also specifically the right to contract, is important 
for blacks and minorities.210  While Williams addresses the 
importance of rights generally, the author’s previous article 
focuses on promissory estoppel.211  Furthermore, in her critique of 
Critical Legal Studies, Williams stresses the importance of 
formality of rights to empower the underprivileged.  While this 
author maintains that although promissory estoppel is a flexible 
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doctrine and an alternative to the formal doctrine of 
consideration, it strengthens the right of underprivileged parties 
to contract.  The Article, then, stresses the importance of the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel in providing disadvantaged 
parties an avenue to enforce promises, to participate in and 
benefit from contracts, to be included in the realm of contract, 
and to have a meaningful right to contract.212 
This Article is a follow-up article.  The aim of this Article is 
to show how promissory estoppel can become a more important 
doctrine and to better serve its role by giving the justice element 
a more robust meaning.  This Article puts the theoretical 
suggestion into practice and indicates one way to make 
promissory estoppel a more meaningful doctrine—by giving 
justice a broader and weightier interpretation.  Furthermore, the 
previous article identified that promissory estoppel is especially 
important to certain groups of promisees, such as employees, 
which are typically the weaker party.  Hence, coloring section 90 
in distributive justice colors will empower these promisees.  The 
previous article advocated using promissory estoppel to achieve 
allocative justice in the formation process.213  This Article shows 
how such a goal can be achieved by a rigorous application of the 
justice element based on a theory of distributive justice. 
Surely other changes can be made in the promissory estoppel 
doctrine to strengthen it.  For example, courts demand a high 
threshold of proof to prove each element of the doctrine.214  Thus, 
one might argue that lowering this burden of proof will do.  
However, rather than changing the current analysis of the 
promise or the reliance elements of promissory estoppel, 
changing the justice element has some advantages.  First, unlike 
the other elements of promissory estoppel, the justice element is 
currently underdeveloped.  Second, strengthening the justice 
element will strengthen the equitable nature of promissory 
estoppel.  Third, an elaborated justice element will make 
promissory estoppel more flexible and a viable alternative to the 
formal and rigid doctrine of consideration.215  As a result, the 
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formation process will be less formal and more conscionable.  The 
contracting process will also be more egalitarian by using the 
justice element to balance the power difference between the 
parties.  Fourth, a broader justice element will result in a more 
effective enforcement of promises.  It will strengthen the 
promissory estoppel doctrine to the benefit of unprivileged 
promisees.  The reliance interest of parties will be better 
protected and more promises will be enforced to the advantage of 
promisees who cannot meet the demands of the doctrine of 
consideration but nevertheless have compelling cases to enforce 
the promises made to them.  Last, contract law will be more 
harmonious in promoting distributive justice through both 
promissory estoppel and unconscionability. 
A significant justice element will, then, make promissory 
estoppel a more meaningful doctrine of contract formation.  This 
will result in a more flexible, egalitarian, and conscionable 
contracting process.  And more generally, this will result in a 
more inclusive and pluralist contract law.  This will benefit first 
and foremost the underprivileged parties.  But this is desirable 
also to parties generally, including dominant parties.  It might be 
that in the short run, privileged parties profit from denying their 
promises after benefiting from the promisee’s behavior.  
However, in the long term, all parties, including privileged 
parties, will benefit from promoting trust and cooperation 
between the parties,216 from protecting the reliance interest,217 
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and from including in contract law parties who have been 
excluded from it in the past.218 
CONCLUSION 
This Article advocates for a change in promissory estoppel 
doctrine.  It argues that enforcing promises under this doctrine 
should not be limited to avoiding injustice, but rather courts 
should actively promote justice.  It further claims that justice 
should be an independent and significant element of promissory 
estoppel based on a theory of distributive justice.  Though 
applying distributive justice to contract law doctrines is not a 
novel concept, current promissory estoppel case law and 
literature are mainly based on corrective justice theory.  This 
robust justice element will make promissory estoppel a more 
important doctrine—a viable and meaningful alternative to the 
doctrine of consideration.  As a result, the contracting process 
will be more flexible and sensitive to distribution and public 
policy issues; the power imbalance in negotiations will be policed; 
the reliance interest of parties will be better protected; and 
underprivileged parties will be empowered and they will be 
better able to use and enjoy their right to contract. 
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